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Abstract
This paper expands the investigation of how PAC spending affects the roll call voting
behavior to the U.S. House of Representatives. Using a theoretical framework which draws
on the voting literature, we develop two models that explain Representatives’ voting behavior
in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. We find weak support for a Downsian view of voting
participation in the first model, and strong support for the alteration of voting incentives
resulting from PAC spending in the second model. These results are consistent with earlier
findings that investigate Senate behavior.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2006 Southern Economics Association Meetings. We are thankful to the
participants of the session for their comments. We would also like to thank Ed Lopez, Calvin Blackwell and Christopher
Westley for their comments. As always any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.
Citation: Calcagno, Peter and John Jackson, (2008) "PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical
Extension." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 25 pp. 1-11




  Political economists have long been examining the rationality of voting (Bowen 1943, 
Downs 1957, Black 1958, Riker and Odershook 1968, Barzel and Silverberg 1973, Tollison and 
Willet 1973, Plott and Levine 1978).  The literature has also addressed numerous issues related 
to the role of political action committees (PACs) regarding voter turnout, roll call voting, 
candidate ideology, campaign financing, political accountability, and policy outcomes 
(Stratmann 1991, 1992, 1998, 2002, Kau and Rubin 1979, 1993, Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 
Grier and Munger 1991, 1993, and Wilhite 1988).  However, little research has addressed the 
effect of PAC contributions on the voting participation of Congress.  Calcagno and Jackson 
(1998) find that PACs directly influence the voting participation of U.S. Senators.  Cohen and 
Noll (1991), Rothenberg and Sanders (1999), and Forgette and Sala (1999) address abstention in 
congressional roll call voting, but not overall voting participation. 
 
2. Background and Theory 
 
  Voting in Congress occurs in one of three ways: voice, division, or roll call. However, 
vote totals are announced only in the case of roll call voting; the others report only the outcome 
of the vote. The House as a legislative body has different constraints placed upon their voting 
behavior than do constituents in electing representatives.  Representatives frequently may vote 
on a particular motion or legislation on more than one occasion.  Furthermore, the institutional 
arrangements of the House of Representatives are different from those in the Senate in several 
ways, including, number of seats held per state, constituent size, length of terms, committee 
structure, and number of members.  McGarrity and Sutter (2000) argue that PACs are trying to 
buy long term access to the Representatives.  Their conclusion provides additional motivation for 
testing the relationships between PACs and House roll call votes.  Calcagno and Jackson (1998) 
find evidence that increasing support from PACs increases voting participation in the Senate.  
Given the institutional differences, noted above, between the Senate and House, it is interesting 
to assess whether the empirical relationships obtained for the Senate hold for the House as well. 
 
PACs became legal in 1974 when Congress amended the Federal Elections Campaign 
Act (FECA).
1  The relation between voting participation and PAC spending has been shown to 
be endogenous (Kau and Rubin 1979, Wilhite and Paul 1989, Wilhite 1988, and Dow and 
Endersby 1994).  We argue that the more money PACs spend, the more incentives exist for a 
Representative to participate in roll call voting to capture a share of the rents.  At the same time, 
if a Representative is consistently participating in roll call votes, then PACs have an incentive to 
contribute to the Representative to gain their support.   
 
According to Congressional Quarterly (1996, 1998, 2000), voting participation in both 
houses have been increasing since the legalization of PACs, and began setting records for voting 
participation in the 1990s.  In the case of the Senate this increase in voting participation was 
attributed to narrow margins of victory in elections (Congressional Quarterly Roll Call, 1988).  
For members of the House, it been has argued that lack of participation in roll call will unseat a 




3. Econometric model and Results 
 
We posit an econometric model for the purpose of testing the affects of PACs on House 
members’ participation in roll call voting.  The data consists of six cross sections of the U.S. 




th sessions of Congress (1956, 1958, and 1960), and the 105
th, 106
th, and 107
th sessions (1998, 
2000, and 2002), respectively.  The explanatory variables are consistent with the literature.
3  We 
measure a Representative’s voting participation by a logistic transformation of the percent of 






= ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦
).  
Our first model without the presence of PACs is estimated as follows: 
 
VPlog = β0 + β1Party + β2Years + β3CMT + β4Chair + β5Vote + β6IR + β7PEY + εt  (1)  
 
where the variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 Party is a dummy variable with a one representing a Democratic Representative and zero 
otherwise. This represents the affect of political ideology on a Representative’s voting record 
(Grier and Munger 1993, Poole and Rosenthal 1997, and Cooper and Young 2002).  Party 
politics and the concomitant political machinery were major players in most elections and 
therefore were the driving force for voting participation prior to the creation of PACs.  Years 
measures the seniority a Representative possesses, which proxies a Representative’s familiarity 
with the voting process (Grier and Munger, 1986).  Serving as a proxy for a Representative’s 
influence and attempt at agenda control are two dummy variables committee membership (CMT) 
and committee chair (Chair).  The model includes the vote share (Vote), a Representative 
received in the last election rather than the margin of victory to allow for the proposition that 
Representatives may change their voting participation in an effort to appeal to their constituency.  
Theory suggests that voting participation may act as a monitoring device on Representatives.  
Thus, we also include the percentage of incumbents that sought reelection and won in the 
previous election cycle (IR).  IR may alternatively be interpreted as an approval rating by 
constituents.  Finally, a dummy variable for presidential election year (PEY) is included with a 
one representing an election year and zero otherwise.  In a pre-PAC world we would a priori 
expect Vote, CMT, and Chair to be negatively related to VPlog, PEY and IR to be positively 
related to VPlog, and Party and Years have an ambiguous effect.  
 
To test for the effects of PACs on roll call voting, we must pool all the data.  PAC is the 
percentage of total political contributions from PACs for the years 1998, 2000, and 2002.
4  We 
expect PAC to have a significant positive effect on Representative’s voting participation.  
Finally, an improvement upon Calcagno and Jackson (1998) is the inclusion of an interaction 
term between Chair and PAC (CHPAC) to determine which factor may be more important in 
affecting voting participation.  The additional variables from both models are also defined in 
Table 1.   
 3 
We treat PAC as an endogenous variable, so that VPlog and PAC are simultaneously 
determined.
5   
 
VPlog = α0+α1Party+α2Years+α3CMT+α4Chair+α5IR+α6PACH +α7Vote+α8PEY+ α9CHPAC+ut   (2) 
 
PAC = χ0 + χ1Party+ χ2Years + χ3CMT + χ4VPlog + χ5IR + χ6PP + χ7RPParty + 
χ8ΒUS + χ9Labor + χ10 Ideology + vt                                                                                                     (3) 
 
The estimation of the reduced form of the system (2) and (3) gives PACH which is then used in 
the estimation of the structural equation for VPlog, i.e., equation (2).
6  According to Wilhite and 
Paul (1989), PAC demonstrates the relative size of PAC support, which is expected to have 
influence over Representatives.  Our theory suggests that this variable should have a pronounced 
positive effect on voting participation in the House.  The larger the relative size of contributions 
by PACs, the more Representatives will partake in roll call votes.  
 
Adding PAC, in theory, should cause changes in the sign and significance of the 
explanatory variables due to the changes in incentives.  Not voting carries with it a missed 
opportunity to provide favor to a special interest group.  One can argue that the more seasoned 
the Representative the better they are at capturing these opportunities, indicating a positive 
relationship between VPlog and Years.
7  The sign expectation for Party, CMT and Chair is 
different in (2) than for (1).  In all these cases, Representative’s with party or committee 
influence may receive more contributions from PACs and thereby vote more.  However, 
according to Stratmann (1992, p.  648), legislators who have little influence are most likely to 
receive contributions, as they have a low “supply price of effort.” 
 
The correlation between IR and voting participation also changes as PACs are added to 
the model.  High IR could cause more PAC support and lower voting participation due to greater 
electoral security, or higher PAC support could bring about greater voting participation so the 
sign becomes ambiguous.  The anticipated sign of PEY also changes.  In a presidential election 
year, a Representative may be away from Washington campaigning for the party’s presidential 
candidate, and seeking the support of PACs. 
 
Table 2 identifies four of the seven independent variables that are statistically significant 
and correctly signed for equation (1).  Party is negative and significant suggesting that the 
Democrats are less likely to participate in roll call votes than Republicans.  Years is also negative 
and significant suggesting that seniority in the House leads to less participation, which is 
consistent with the findings of Cooper and Young (2002).  Percent of incumbents reelected and 
committee chairs are both negative and significant at the .10 level. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 When  PAC is added to the model, only the signs of IR and PEY change.  The variables 
Years, Vote, Chair, and PEY are all statistically significant.  Years, Vote and Chair all continue 
to be negative suggesting that seniority (or being closer to retirement), high vote share, and 
power that resides from serving on committees provide electoral security and allows for shirking 
that discourages voting participation.  IR changes in sign in equation (2), which suggests that 
high incumbency rates are more likely to encourage voting participation after the addition of 4 
PACs, but not significantly.  As anticipated, PEY discourages voting as many representatives are 
out trying to draw support for their presidential candidate.  The variable of interest, PAC, is 
positive and significant at the .01 level suggesting that PACs provide the motivation for high 
voting participation.  The fact that this is positive while the other variables are negative continues 
to give credence to the earlier findings of Parker (1989) and Calcagno and Jackson (1998) that 
PAC contributions and not electoral security are motivating the record voting participation rates.  
Chair is negative, but not statistically significant suggesting that, if anything, committee chairs 
are less likely to vote, while PAC is positive and significant.  The interaction term is positive and 
significant, which suggest that committee chairs are more likely to vote the higher are their PAC 
contributions. 
 
A striking difference between these results and those found for the Senate relates to 
voting participation of committee chairs.  In Calcagno and Jackson (1998), Chair was dropped 
after some preliminary modeling due to insignificance.  For the House, however, Chair is 
negative and (marginally) significant, both with and without PAC in the model, indicating that 
committee chairs who receive no PAC funding vote less often than other Representatives, ceteris 
paribus.  But the Chair-PAC interaction coefficient is positive and (also, marginally) significant, 
indicating that if committee chairs receive PAC contributions, they vote more often than other 
Representatives, and that participation increases with the size of PAC contributions.  This result 
demonstrates the role that PACs play in increasing voting participation of some of the most 
important House members. 
 
There exists the possibility of multicollinearity in our findings.  To combat this problem 
we run variations of equation (2) substituting only one explanatory variable in turn to test the 
PAC coefficient’s sensitivity to alternative model specifications.  All of the variables that are 
statistically significant maintain sign and significance.  These results are reported in Table 3 and 
clearly reflect the robustness of the PAC effect on VPlog. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Is it rational for a Representative to vote? It is the responsibility of each Representative to 
partake in roll call votes, but PACs have made it more advantageous.  The institutional 
arrangements between the two houses of congress are different, but we find that the creation of 
PACs, by and large, did not change the overall incentives for the House (with the exception of 
the Chair effect), it merely reinforced them.  Representatives benefit from participating in roll 
call votes by increasing the rents they can extract from PACs.  To put it simply, House voting 
participation is increasing because of PAC contributions.  This finding is consistent with theory 
and with the previous finding for the Senate.   5 
Table I. Description of variables 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Description  Variable Source 
VPlog  Log odds ratio of voting participation 
on House roll call votes 
Congressional 
Quarterly Roll Call 
Party  Political party 1 = Democrat; 0 = 
Republican 
Congressional 
Quarterly Roll Call 
Years  Number of years in the House   Congressional 
Directory 
CMT  Number of committees a 
Representative serves on  
Congressional 
Directory 
Chair  Committee Chair = 1; 0 otherwise  Congressional 
Directory 
Vote  Percentage of votes received in the 
last election  
Congressional 
Directory and 
Statistical Abstract of 
the United States 
IR  Percentage of incumbents reelected   Statistical Abstract of 
the United States 
PAC  Percentage of total contributions from 
PACs between 1998–2002  
Center for Responsive 
Politics 
PP  Political party of the president 1 = 
Democrat; 0 = Republican 
Statistical Abstract of 
the United States 
PEY  Presidential election year  =1; 0 
otherwise 
Statistical Abstract of 
the United States 
RPParty  Representative and President are the 
same party =1; 0 otherwise 
Statistical Abstract of 
the United States 
CHPAC  Interaction variable of Chair and PAC  - 
 6 
Table II. Estimates of Equations 1 and 2 
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient 






























PAC  -  .9551145 
(3.12)*** 
CHPAC  -  .8772563 
(1.84)* 




N  1278 2553 
F  13.00 30.56 
R
2  0.0669 0.0981 
Adj R
2  0.0617 0.0949 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis statistical significance is indicated as follows *.10, **.05, ***.01 
a Indicates one tail test 7 
Table III. Additional Estimates of Equation 2 
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
















































Party  -  -.2858666 
(-4.75)***  - -  -  - 
Vote  - -  -.9453728 
(-4.68)***  - -  - 
IR  - - -  4.968803 
(2.11)**  - - 




CHPAC  - - - -  -  1.088772 
(2.45)*** 












N  2553 2553 2553 2553  2553  2553 
F  56.67 50.22 50.08 46.37  45.35  39.94 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis statistical significance is indicated as follows *.10, **.05, ***.01 8 
References  
 
Barzel, Y., and E. Silberberg (1973) “Is The Act Of Voting Rational?” Public Choice 16, 51–57.  
 
Becker, G.S. (1983) “A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 371–400. 
 
Black, D. (1958) The Theory Of Committees And Elections. London: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Bowen, H.R. (1943) “The Interpretation Of Voting In The Allocation Of Economic Resources” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 58, 27–48.  
 
Calcagno, P.T., and J.D. Jackson (1998) “Political Action Committee Spending and Senate Roll 
Call Voting” Public Choice 97, 569-585. 
 
Coates, D., and M.C. Munger (1995) “Legislative Voting And The Economic Theory Of 
Politics” Southern Economic Journal 61, 861–872.  
 
Cohen, L.R., and R.G. Noll (1991) “How To Vote, Whether To Vote: Strategies For Voting And 
Abstaining Of Congressional Roll Calls” Political Behavior 13, 97-127. 
 
Congressional Quarterly Roll Call 1988: A Chronology And Analysis Of Vote In The House And 
Senate. 100th Congress Second Session (1988). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.  
 
Cooper, J., and G. Young (2002) “Party And Preference In Congressional Decision Making: Roll 
Call Voting In The House Of Representatives, 1889-1999”, in New Directions in Studying the 
History of the U.S. Congress M.D. McCubbins and D.W. Brady, Eds., Stanford University Press, 
64-106. 
 
Denzau, A.T., and M.C. Munger (1986) “Legislator And Interest Groups: How Unorganized 
Interests Get Represented” American Political Science Review 80, 89–106.  
 
Dow, J.K., and J.W. Endersby (1994) “Campaign Contributions And Legislative Voting In The 
California Assembly” American Politics Quarterly 22, 334–353.  
 
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory Of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.  
 
Fotgette, R., and B.R. Sala (1999) “Conditional Party Government And Member Turnout On 
Senate Record Votes, 1873-1935” Journal of Politics 61, 467-484. 
 
Grier, K.B., and M.C. Munger (1986) “The Impact Of Legislator Attributes On Interest-Group 
Campaign Contributions” Journal of Labor Research 7, 349–361.  
 
Grier, K.B., and M.C. Munger (1991) “Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, And 
Campaign Contributions To House Incumbents” Economic Inquiry 29, 24–43.  9 
 
Grier, K.B., and M.C. Munger (1993) “Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions To House 
And Senate Incumbents, 1980–1986” The Journal of Politics 55, 615–643.  
 
Kau, J., and P. Rubin (1979) “Self Interest, Ideology, And Logrolling In Congressional Voting” 
Journal of Law and Economics 22, 365-384. 
 
Kau, J., and P. Rubin (1993) “Ideology, Voting And Shirking” Public Choice 76, 151-172. 
 
McGarrity, J.P., and D. Sutter (2000) “A Test Of The Structure Of PAC Contracts: An Analysis 
Of House Gun Control Votes In The 1980s” Southern Economic Journal 67, 41-63. 
 
Mintz, E. (1996) “Members’ Roll Call Attendance Sets Election –Year Record” Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report 55, 34-39. 
 
Parker, G.R. (1989) “Looking Beyond Reelection: Revising Assumptions About Factors 
Motivating Congressional Behavior” Public Choice 63, 237–252.  
 
Plott, C.R., and M.E. Levine (1978) “A Model Of Agenda Influence On Committee Decisions” 
American Economic Review 68, 146–160.  
 
Poole, K.T., and H. Rosenthal (1997) Congress: A Political-Economic History Of Roll Call 
Voting, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Riker, W.H., and P.C. Ordeshook (1968) “A Theory Of The Calculus Of Voting” American 
Political Science Review 62, 25-42. 
 
Rothenberg, L.S., and M. Sanders (1999) “Rational Abstention And Congressional Vote Choice” 
Economics and Politics 11, 311-340. 
 
Salmore, S.A., and B.G. Salmore (1989) Candidates, Parties And Campaigns: Electoral Politics 
In America (2
nd edn.) Washington D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press. 
 
Stratmann, T. (1991) “What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Casual Effects Of 
Money And Votes” Southern Economic Journal 57, 606-620. 
 
Stratmann, T. (1992) “Are Contributors Rational?: Untangling Strategies Of Political Action 
Committees” Journal of Political Economy 100, 647–664.  
 
Stratmann, T. (1998) “The Market For Congressional Votes: Is Timing Of Contributions 
Everything?” Journal of Law and Economics 41, 85-113. 
 
Stratmann, T. (2002) “Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence From Financial 
Services Legislation” Journal of Law and Economics 45, 345-373. 
 10 
Tollison, R.D., and T.D. Willett (1973) “The Simple Economics Of Voting And Not Voting” 
Public Choice 16, 59–71.  
 
Wilhite, A. (1988) “Union PAC Contributions And Legislative Voting” Journal of Labor 
Research 9, 79–90. 
 
Wilhite, A., and C. Paul (1989) “Corporate Campaign Contributions And Legislative Voting” 
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 29, 73–85.  11 
Notes 
                                                 
1 This amendment followed from the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Pipefitters Local #52 vs 
the United States see Grier and Munger (1986) for a more detailed historical account. Coates and 
Munger (1995), Denzau and Munger (1986), and Becker (1983) are representative of the 
theoretical work on special interest contributions.  Works by Grier and Munger (1993, 1991, 
1986), Wilhite (1988), Wilhite and Paul (1989), Parker (1989), Stratmann (1991, 1992, 1998, 
2002) and, Dow and Endersby (1994) are representative of the empirical literature on the issue. 
 
2 Salmore and Salmore (1989), Mintz, (1996) and Rothenberg and Sanders (1999) all point to the 
1984 election between McConnell and Huddleston where McConnell unseated the incumbent by 
focusing on his lack of participation in roll call votes as motivation for the increase in voting 
participation in the House. 
 
3 Hawaii and Alaska had not formally been adopted into the union in 1958 so the observations 
for that year are not available.  To be consistent, these states are removed from the sample 
altogether.  Also, observations for the state of Arkansas and Ohio are removed for the 86
th 
Congress due to lack of election data.  Three observations are removed from the 105
th (New 
York, New Mexico, and Texas) and 106
th (California, Georgia, and Louisiana) Congress and six 
from the 107
th (Arkansas, California, Florida, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Virginia) due 
to special elections that occurred limiting the availability of election data. 
 
4 This data is compiled from the Center for Responsive Politics web page 
http://www.opensecrets.org 
 
5 See Calcagno and Jackson (1998) for a detailed explanation of the relationships modeled in the 
PAC equation. 
 
6 Representative President Party (RPParty) and presidential party (PP) are introduced in (3) as 
additional variables to formulate the PAC equation in the 2SLS system.  RPParty is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the Representative and the President are of the same party and zero 
otherwise.  Representatives may attract more or less PAC contributions depending upon the 
degree of coalition that exists between the House and the executive branch.  PP is also a dummy 
variable and follows the same format as Party.  One suspects that Representatives are less likely 
to support bills that are favored by a president of the opposing party.  Therefore, individual 
Representatives are more likely to vote in roll call votes when their own party holds the 
presidency.  Which implies the party in power is likely to receive greater support from PACs.  
Thus, the relationship is a positive one.  In addition, the percentage of PAC contributions from 
businesses (BUS), labor organizations (Labor), and ideological or single issue group (Ideology) 
are included as they reflect the total amount.  We think this is an advancement over the earlier 
study regarding the Senate.  The reduced form equation for PAC is available from the authors 
upon request. 
 
7 Year of service was found to be positive, but not significant in Calcagno and Jackson (1998). 